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INTRODUCTION  
Much remained unsettled when Jonathan Larson dropped dead of an 
aortic dissection just hours after the final dress rehearsal.  The script he had 
been working with collaborators to revise for months was approaching 
completion, but the legal status of that collaboration itself remained in limbo.  
Like most artists on the eve of a hard deadline—opening night—Larson was 
consumed with making the show the best version of itself that it could be.  
Spending those last, precious hours divvying up his speculative millions in 
royalties would have seemed both a waste of valuable time and outrageously 
hubristic.  Larson had presented work in a handful of workshop productions 
in New York and won a couple of awards, but this full-fledged rock musical 
was on a very different scale in terms of ambition, resources, and number of 
people implicated in its failure or success.  What mattered was that it be good, 
and as canny artists know, good ideas can come from anywhere. 
The year was 1996 and the show was Rent.  After it opened, it was, by most 
metrics, a smashing success.  It won the Pulitzer Prize for Drama.
1
  It went on 
to run on Broadway for 12 years, grossing more than $280 million.
2
  It toured 
extensively.
3
  It was translated into many languages and produced all over the 
world.
4
  It was made into a movie that people went to see, despite the fact that 
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 1 The 1996 Pulitzer Prize Winner in Drama: Rent, by Jonathan Larson, THE PULITZER PRIZES, 
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/jonathan-larson (last visited Oct. 19, 2020). 
 2 Richard Zoglin, Life After Rent, TIME (Feb. 29, 2008),  
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/printout/0,8816,1718572,00.html.  
 3 TOM ROWAN, RENT FAQ: ALL THAT’S LEFT TO KNOW ABOUT BROADWAY’S BLAZE OF GLORY 
310 (2017). 
 4 Id. 
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it featured many of the original performers looking decades too old and 
entirely too well-fed to credibly play the starving artists called for by the script.
5
  
Somewhat improbably for a musical about AIDS, heroin addiction, and 
homosexuality in the East Village in the 1980s, Rent was also adapted into 
Rent School Edition, which continues to generate substantial royalties as it is 
licensed for high school performances worldwide.
6
 
Larson is still dead, so all of the money he would have been entitled to as 
the author of the show’s music, lyrics, and book passes to his estate.  Not 
everyone believes that this is how things should have shaken out.  Shortly 
before the musical transferred to Broadway, the production’s dramaturg, Lynn 
Thomson, approached Larson’s heirs and told them she believed that Larson, 
had he lived, would have offered her a small percentage of his royalties to 
acknowledge the extent of the contribution she had made to Rent.7  When 
Thomson was engaged to work on the project, Larson had songs and a script 
that was by all accounts narratively defective.
8
  Thomson claimed that she 
contributed a significant portion of original dialogue in addition to helping 
shape the overall story and structure of the piece.
9
  While Thomson had 
originally signed a contract agreeing to a flat fee in consideration for services 
rendered, as her collaboration with Larson proceeded, she felt, her role as a 
collaborator had evolved into something more closely resembling a co-
author.
10
  Larson’s heirs did not agree, so Thomson took them to court.
11
  She 
lost.
12
  Affirming the verdict upon its appeal to the Second Circuit, Judge 
Calabresi found that because there was no evidence that Larson intended to 
make Thomson a co-author, she was entitled to nothing more than the fee 
specified in her original contract.
13
 
No one was in a position to say definitively what Larson would have done 
once it became clear that Rent was on its way to becoming a lucrative global 
phenomenon.  Perhaps he would have been generous, as the producers of the 
wildly successful Broadway musical Hamilton recently proved themselves to 
 
 5 See A. O. Scott, New Tenants in Tinseltown, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2005), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/23/movies/new-tenants-in-tinseltown.html (reviewing the film 
production of Rent). 
 6 ROWAN, supra note 3. 
 7 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 8 See id. at 197 (noting that the professional consensus concerning Rent was that, while promising, it 
needed much work). 
 9 Id. at 198 n.10.  
 10 Id. at 197–98. 
 11 Id. at 198. 
 12 Id. at 199.  
 13 Id. at 206–07.  
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be in agreeing to share profits with members of that production’s original cast.
14
  
Because it was to be Larson’s name up on the marquee, however, any royalty-
sharing he agreed to would have been an act of charity.
15
  His desires would 
have been all that mattered. 
There was and is no reliable mechanism for an uncredited co-author to 
claim what is hers in defiance of a credited author’s wishes in a situation such 
as Thomson’s, where a collaboration organically develops to the point where 
original roles become altered beyond recognition.
16
  The ability of key 
collaborators to participate in the profits generated by their work should not 
depend on the kindness of strangers. 
For all the hype it generated, Rent was a fairly conventional theatrical work, 
with fairly traditional creative roles occupied in fairly conventional ways by its 
collaborators, and existing copyright law still failed to equitably accommodate 
these stakeholders.  As I will demonstrate in this Article, the law is wholly out 
of step with more innovative forms of theater-making, which make clear the 
need for a renovation of the joint works doctrine and, I argue, the creation of 
a new court system to adjudicate complex questions of aesthetics and aesthetic 
production moving forward. 
I. INCENTIVES FOR ART 
There are at least three arguments against going to the trouble of modifying 
the institution of copyright to render it more hospitable to the unpredictable 
idiosyncrasies of the avant-garde.  First, no economic incentive is necessary to 
stimulate innovative cultural production—there have always been and probably 
always will be irrepressible artists willing to do their work for free.
17
  Second, 
 
 14 Richard Morgan, How Hamilton’s Cast Got Broadway’s Best Deal, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-hamilton-broadway-profit/. 
 15 See Thomson, 147 F.3d at 203–04 (“Every script brought to [the court’s] attention says, ‘Rent, by 
Jonathan Larson.’”). 
 16 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683, 1688 (2014) (“The 
search for ‘intent’ as part of the unplanned coauthorship inquiry is thus unquestionably a proxy for 
various normative considerations, which courts have failed to articulate with any degree of 
coherence.”). 
 17 See Jillian Steinhauer, Artists Still Not Getting Paid (But at Least We’re Starting to Talk About It), 
HYPERALLERGIC (June 5, 2014), https://hyperallergic.com/130371/artists-still-not-getting-paid-but-at-
least-were-starting-to-talk-about-it/ (discussing a recent report finding that 71% of artists exhibiting 
their work in publicly-funded galleries received no fee); see also William Powhida, Why Are (Most) 
Artists (So Fucking) Poor?, HYPERALLERGIC (Apr. 23, 2012), https://hyperallergic.com/50333/why-
are-most-artists-so-fucking-poor-william-powhida-wage/ (discussing the difference between paying 
artists for the work they produce and funding their work and role as educators in general, and finding 
that if payment were added to exhibition budgets, there would be fewer exhibits). 
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actual litigation will almost always be prohibitively expensive for artists working 
in theater and performance, who typically operate on slim-to-negative profit 
margins.  Third, many of the most significant theater and performance artists 
of the last century or so have expressly rejected the concept of “owning” works 
of art at all. 
One could be forgiven for wondering why it should matter that the 
intellectual property rights of artists working in a medium that almost always 
loses money are insufficiently protected.
18
  In the United States, copyright is 
primarily understood as a way to encourage creative production by providing 
an economic incentive.
19
  The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
provides that Congress has the power to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”
20
  At the 
founding, American copyright law was “a distinctly utilitarian construct[.]”
21
  
Today, courts and scholars still “understand and discuss the institution of 
copyright in wholly instrumental terms.”
22
  We tell ourselves that it makes 
sense to have a system for regulating intellectual property and compensating 
“owners” of intellectual property because without the promise of 
compensation creative people would stop creating, would create less, or would 
invest less in the way of time, energy, and other resources in their creative 
endeavors.  This rationale makes more sense in the realm of patent law, where 
significant capital may be necessary to even begin working towards the 
realization of an idea for, say, a new cancer-fighting drug in the lab. 
As Rebecca Tushnet has argued, however, the economic incentive 
rationale for copyright protection bears little relationship to the reality of 
creativity for most artists.
23
  After all, “[d]esire, not calculation, drives much 
creative practice.”
24
  The desire to make art is closer to what most people would 
 
 18 See Ben Steverman, Investing in a Broadway Show is a Fun Way to Lose a Lot of Money, 
BLOOMBERG: BUSINESS (June 3, 2015, 9:39 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
06-03/investing-in-a-broadway-show-is-a-fun-way-to-lose-a-lot-of-money (discussing how only 20% to 
25% of shows make back their initial investment). 
 19 See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 85–123 (2003) (discussing the economic incentive theory of 
copyright). 
 20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 21 Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 611 (2006). 
 22 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of 
Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1664 (2012). 
 23 Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV., 513, 516 (2009). 
 24 Id. 
April 2021] THEATER, COPYRIGHT, AND THE INEFFABLE 497 
recognize as masochism than to rational self-interest.  The vast majority of 
artists toil their lives away in obscurity, often supporting their art habit with 
more remunerative work.
25
  The artist may bare her soul in highly personal 
work in the hope that someone will see her, recognize her, and love and praise 
her for who she really is, but the artist who exposes herself is just as likely to 
be mocked, accused of self-indulgence, pretension, or worse.
26
  Nevertheless, 
people destroy their lives in order to become artists with some frequency.  
They go into debt.
27
  They disappoint their parents.  They neglect their 
children.  They develop substance-abuse problems.
28
  They ruin or forego 
relationships.  They wait tables or bag groceries well into middle age.
29
  These 
are not people we can assume will respond predictably to rational incentive 
structures.  Only a passion utterly hostile to rational self-interest could motivate 
a person without a trust fund to pursue a career in the arts.
30
  Yet we continue 
to cling to the origin myth of the would-be artist soberly evaluating her options, 
electing not to go into business, medicine, or law, but instead opting to write 
novels because the Copyright Clause ensures that this pursuit, too, will provide 
 
 25 See Sarah Cascone, How Hard Is It to Make It as an Artist?, ARTNET NEWS (June 12, 2018), 
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/artist-financial-stability-survey-
1300895#:~:text=Nearly%20half%20of%20artists%20surveyed,their%20money%20off%20their%20
art (reporting that 61% of artists engage in freelance work and 42% have other jobs). 
 26 In one review, the notoriously vituperative critic John Simon once wrote “I always thought Miss [Liza] 
Minnelli’s face deserving—of first prize in the beagle category.  Less aphoristically speaking, it is a face 
going off in three directions simultaneously: the nose always en route to becoming a trunk, blubber 
lips unable to resist the pull of gravity, and a chin trying its damnedest to withdraw into the neck, 
apparently to avoid responsibility for what goes on above it.  It is, like any face, one that could be 
redeemed by genuine talent, but Miss Minnelli has only brashness, pathos, and energy.”  JOHN 
SIMON, JOHN SIMON ON THEATER: CRITICISM, 1974–2003, at 87 (2005).  In another, he described 
an Edward Albee play as “the woolliest, phoniest, most pretentious woolgathering this side of the 
world’s biggest sheep-shearing festival.”  Id. at 786.  He began another “Mediocrity, thy name is Leslie 
Bricusse, unless it be Frank Wildhorn.  They are the co-authors of [the Broadway musical] Jekyll & 
Hyde.”  Id. at 676. 
 27 See Diep Tran, How Rising Student Debt Affects Theatre Graduates, AM. THEATRE (June 10, 
2014), https://www.americantheatre.org/2014/06/10/how-rising-student-debt-has-affected-theatre-
graduates-2/ (showing that in a poll of 500 theatre artists, 98.6% of those polled took out some student 
loans). 
 28 See Ana Butkovic & Dunja Rancic Dopudj, Personality Traits and Alcohol Consumption of Classical 
and Heavy Metal Musicians, 45 PSYCH. MUSIC 246, 248–249 (2017) (finding alcohol consumption 
and the use of illicit drugs prevalent amongst musicians). 
 29 See, e.g., Aja Romano, Geoffrey Owens, Actor and Trader Joe’s Employee, Sparked a Debate About 
How We Value Work, VOX (Sept. 4, 2018, 1:11 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/9/4/17818300/geoffrey-owens-work-job-trader-joes-
actorswithdayjobs. 
 30 See Rachel Campbell-Johnston, ‘We Are in Danger of Having a Generation of Trust Fund Artists,’ 
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/we-are-in-danger-of-having-a-generation-
of-trust-fund-artists-bkjsqg3vgrs (arguing that rising art school tuition fees are making careers in the 
arts increasingly inaccessible to low-income students).  
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her with a solid livelihood.  “To induce individuals to undertake the personal 
sacrifices necessary to create such works,” as one judge put it, “federal 
copyright law extends to the authors of such works a limited monopoly to reap 
the rewards of their endeavors.”
31
  When it is clear that no such extrinsic 
inducement is needed to ensure that the public will always have a steady stream 
of art to consume or disregard as it pleases, what good is copyright really 
doing? 
This paradox is particularly pronounced in the theater, where even at the 
highest levels of achievement, there is only very seldom any serious money at 
stake, and therefore only very seldom any reason or means to litigate. As 
Jennifer Womack puts it, “it is only the rich and famous, who are few and far 
between in the theater industry, who have the resources to bring a claim in 
court for an alleged infringement of their work.”
32
  A playwright whose work is 
regularly presented on Broadway may earn a respectable living, but Broadway 
has, with the occasional triumphant exception, “ceased to be a hospitable place 
for the serious American drama.”
33
  The American theater is a strange art form 
in that, unlike the visual arts, the most critically significant work and the most 
highly compensated almost never overlap.  If the institution of copyright is 
desperately in need of modification due to its failure to accommodate the 
unique needs of theater artists who charge fifteen dollars per ticket and 
perform in leaky basements, disused churches, and public parks, it is not 
because a change in the law will result in a significant change in the way profits 
are shared among collaborators.  There will likely continue to be little to no 
profit to share in almost every case. 
Finally, it might seem paradoxical to urge the legal framework for 
intellectual property ownership in the direction of more granular possessory 
arrangements when the live art of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has 
increasingly sought to evade ownership structures, steadily defying the very 
logic of ownership and acquisition.  This trend can be said to have begun in 
1909 with the Italian Futurists, who rejected theater that was “static” in favor 
of dynamic events that solicited the audience’s collaboration, thereby making 
each performance a unique and unrepeatable experience.
34
  For the Futurists, 
 
 31 Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 678 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 32 See Jennifer Womack, Big Shop of Horrors: Ownership in Theatrical Design, 18 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J., 225, 237 (2007). 
 33 TODD LONDON, AN IDEAL THEATER: FOUNDING VISIONS FOR A NEW AMERICAN ART 506 
(2013). 
 34 FILIPPO TOMMASO MARINETTI, THE VARIETY THEATER (1913), reprinted in 
THEATRE/THEORY/THEATRE: THE MAJOR CRITICAL TEXTS FROM ARISTOTLE AND ZEAMI TO 
SOYINKA AND HAVEL 422 (Daniel Gerould ed., R. W. Flint, trans., 2000) 
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the sole raison d’être of the theater artist was “incessantly to invent new 
elements of astonishment,” performances that refused to be fixed or 
finalized.
35
  One of their troupes called itself the “Theatre of Surprise.”
36
  
Inspired in part by the Futurists, an international group of artists converged in 
Zurich in 1916 and established the Cabaret Voltaire and the movement that 
would come to be known as Dada.
37
  The Dadaists trafficked in noise, 
nonsense, cacophony, and chaotic spontaneity, reacting to the carnage of the 
First World War by striving to outdo in performance the violence, illogic, and 
unpredictability that characterized the Europe they saw destroying itself all 
around them.
38
  In the United States, artists such as composer John Cage and 
choreographer Merce Cunningham began collaborating on multimedia 
spectacles and introducing aleatory methods into their work in the 1950s.
39
  
Cunningham would write discrete choreographic steps and gestures for 
different parts of the body down on scraps of paper, then draw them at random 
to determine the order of the dance before each performance, or use playing 
cards or coin tosses to sequence them.
40
  Such a piece lacks an “original” that 
could be “copied.”  The piece may be radically different from one 
performance to the next, and yet it is always authentically itself.  Subsequent 
performance art in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly feminist performance art, 
made the body itself the medium of expression, resisting the commodification 
that afflicted the visual art world by divorcing art and object—the presence of 
the performer could not be bought, sold, and resold for a higher price, could 
not be hung up on a wall or permanently exhibited at a museum.
41
  Some of 
Adrian Piper’s Mythic Being performances consisted of her cross-dressing, 
roaming the streets of New York, and observing people’s reactions to her 
Black male persona.
42
  For Interior Scroll, Carolee Schneemann appeared 
 
 35 Id. at 421. 
 36 ROSELEE GOLDBERG, PERFORMANCE: LIVE ART 1909 TO THE PRESENT 21 (1979). 
 37 Id. at 34. 
 38 See HUGO BALL, FLIGHT OUT OF TIME: A DADA DIARY 61 (John Elderfield ed., Ann Raimes 
trans., 1996) (“Our cabaret is a gesture.  Every word that is spoken and sung here says at least this 
one thing: that this humiliating age has not succeeded in winning our respect.  What could be 
respectable and impressive about it?  Its cannons?  Our big drum drowns them.  Its idealism?  That 
has long been a laughingstock, in its popular and its academic edition.  The grandiose slaughters and 
cannibalistic exploits?  Our spontaneous foolishness and our enthusiasm for illusion will destroy 
them.”). 
 39 GOLDBERG, supra note 36, at 82. 
 40 Id. at 81. 
 41 See Peggy Phelan, Marina Abramović: Witnessing Shadows, 56 THEATRE J., 569, 570 (2004) 
(discussing the opposition to commodity-based art in the 1970s). 
 42 John P. Bowles, “Acting like a Man”: Adrian Piper’s Mythic Being and Black Feminism in the 1970s, 
32 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 621, 626 (2007). 
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nude before an audience, extracted a folded-up ribbon of paper from her 
vagina, and read from it a text that counterposed intuitive, bodily-informed, 
traditionally “feminine” creative processes and rational, traditionally “male” 
processes.
43
  In Yoko Ono’s Cut Piece, the artist invited spectators to approach 
and take turns cutting off pieces of her clothing with a pair of scissors.
44
  For 
such performances, you quite literally had to be there.  Such events traffic in 
the ineffable, in a particular timbre of presence.  Such events produce no 
objects.  Such experiences are not portable.  Any re-performance will 
necessarily entail a transformation.
45
 
Despite the fact that a more nimble and inclusive joint authorship doctrine 
is unlikely to stimulate more or better creative production, is unlikely to be 
enforced in court, and is likely to run counter to at least the philosophical 
commitments of many leading artists, a society that declines to recognize the 
value of its artists’ most consequential contributions is an impoverished 
society.  It matters whether individual collaborators have standing to avail 
themselves of copyright protections because, at present, the copyright system 
is the only legal system we have for assigning social value to works of art or 
their component parts—we nullify them when we determine that they are not 
legally cognizable and reify them by deeming them protectable.  If our legal 
system is not equipped to parse innovative performance work, it signals a 
profound lack of national investment in the arts, that is, a profound 
underinvestment in the very substrate of civilization. 
The existence of a legal right is socially and culturally meaningful even if it 
is never tested or enforced in court.  The bare existence of a legal right or 
prohibition shapes behavior, social norms, and expectations.  As 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh observes, copyright law performs “an important 
‘guidance’ function, independent of and in addition to any potential incentive 
it may provide to creators.”
46
  Consciously or instinctively, we “know” that it is 
“wrong” to copy or take credit for someone else’s work in part because we 
have internalized at least the general contours of what is enshrined in law by 
the Copyright Act of 1976.  What is more, even if the law could be shown to 
have no impact on behavior, law codifies and articulates what we value, and 
this articulation is itself socially meaningful.  This is what Cass Sunstein calls 
 
 43 JAYNE WARK, RADICAL GESTURES: FEMINISM AND PERFORMANCE ART IN NORTH AMERICA 45 
(2006). 
 44 Jessica Rizzo, Now You See Her, 44 THEATER 96, 99 (2014). 
 45 Id. at 96. 
 46 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of 
Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1674 (2012). 
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“the expressive function of law[,]”  that is, “the notion that the valuation that 
law expresses is worth attention independent of social consequences.”
47
  In the 
realm of copyright law, these functions—guidance and expression—may be as 
important if not more important than the law’s instrumental function. 
Ryan Morris, who works with indigent artists as Executive Director of 
Philadelphia Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts (PVLA), frequently hears from 
artists that remuneration is not their primary consideration in seeking to obtain 
copyright protection of their work.
48
  For the artists who come to PVLA, 
Morris reports, seeking copyright protection is more typically “about pride in 
ownership.”
49
  In Morris’s experience, artists “want to notify others that they 
were the original author of a given work, and they want to be able to definitively 
control and shape the way their work is portrayed.”
50
  Since the United States 
lacks the more robust frameworks for guaranteeing artists’ moral rights that 
exist in some countries, according to Morris, copyright is the best tool for 
artists who want to prevent their work from being used in a way that violates 
their wishes.
51
  For the artists Morris works with, monetary considerations are 
often secondary to the “recognition” that copyright protection provides.
52
  
“Artists put a lot of time, effort, blood, sweat, and tears into the creation of 
their works,” he says, “[i]t is a significant commitment.”
53
  Artists, Morris 
continues, “want to be recognized for their creations.  They want to have that 
right of attribution enforced.”
54
  He recalls working with one client, an older 
jazz musician who had recorded a few songs with a collaborator over forty 
years ago.
55
  When he came to PVLA, the client’s problem was that his 
collaborator, all these years later, was now selling copies of the recording they 
 
 47 Cass R. Sunstein, Conflicting Values in Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661, 1668–1669 (1994).  See 
also Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 823 (1994) 
(“A society might identify the kind of valuation to which it is committed and insist on that kind, even 
if the consequences of the insistence are obscure or unknown.  A society might, for example, insist 
on an antidiscrimination law for expressive reasons even if it does not know whether the law actually 
helps members of minority groups.  A society might protect endangered species partly because it 
believes that the protection makes best sense of its self-understanding, by expressing an appropriate 
valuation of what it means for one species to eliminate another.  A society might endorse or reject 
capital punishment because it wants to express a certain understanding of the appropriate course of 
action after one person has taken the life of another.”). 
 48 Telephone Interview with Ryan Morris, Executive Director, Philadelphia Volunteer Lawyers for the 
Arts (Jan. 23, 2020). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
55  Id. 
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had made together, but without listing him as a coauthor or giving him any 
share in the proceeds.
56
  The pride the client took in his work was evident.  
Money was a secondary consideration.  “[E]ven if I can’t get the money,” the 
musician told Morris, “even if I can’t get the royalties that I’m owed, I still want 
the recognition, I still want him to tell the truth, to say that I was part of this, 




II. STRUCTURES OF COLLABORATION 
It has been observed that the concept of joint authorship as articulated in 
the current Copyright Act “does not begin to accommodate the unique 
problems of theatrical collaboration.”
58
  As Thomson’s ordeal suggests, the 
function and position of the dramaturg is paradigmatic of the problems 
associated with teasing out theatrical authorship.  Even many people who work 
in the theater do not understand what it is that the dramaturg does.
59
  Her job 
is heavily dependent on the individual project and the particular personalities 
in the rehearsal room—the case of the dramaturg will always be fact-specific.
60
 
Dramaturgs perform a wide range of functions, some integral and some 
incidental.  Their more minor contributions are, paradoxically, the most 
visible, while their most important work may be completely imperceptible to 
anyone but themselves.  Some dramaturgs, particularly those employed on a 
full-time basis by regional theaters, may produce distinct quantities of what can 
be identified as their own work-product.  They may draft contextualizing 
essays to be printed in the playbill.  They may craft demystifying lobby displays 
for the audience to peruse while waiting for the house to open.
61
  When 
working on a play written in another historical era or any play that seeks to 
“realistically” depict a distinct place and time, a dramaturg might research and 
 
56  Id. 
57 Id. 
 58 Susan Keller, Comment, Collaboration in Theater: Problems and Copyright Solutions, 33 UCLA L. 
Rev. 891, 909 (1986). 
 59 See Lawrence Switzky, Dramaturgy as Skill, Function, and Verb, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION 
TO DRAMATURGY 173 (Magda Romanska ed., 2014) (“What is continuous over two centuries is the 
ambition of the dramaturg’s role, as well as the diffuseness, and often illegibility, of dramaturgical 
work in the eyes of the rest of a production staff.”). 
 60 See id. (“Any description of dramaturgical work requires an unusually flexible frame.”). 
 61 See Miriam Weisfeld, Framing the Theatrical Experience: Lobby Displays, in THE ROUTLEDGE 
COMPANION TO DRAMATURGY, supra note 59, at 472 (noting that lobby displays educate audiences 
about aspects of the play with which they are unfamiliar, spark discussion amongst members, and 
fuel enthusiasm for the theater among multiple goals). 
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report back to the director and designers on period-specific details that enable 
the production to attain greater verisimilitude.
62
  What brand of cigarettes 
might an elegant, well-to-do woman like this character have smoked in the 
1920s?  What kind of music might have been playing at this kind of club in 
this part of town in 1979?  This kind of research-driven dramaturgy is relatively 
straightforward, and while it may help to frame or add texture to the work of 
the production’s principal artists, it is more instrumental than creative. 
When dealing with the first production of a new play, as Thomson’s 
experience indicates, the dramaturg’s role is often more complex.  The 
dramaturg may work closely with the playwright from the first draft through 
the last.
63
  The dramaturg may be a part of initial discussions about the work 
even before a word is written.
64
  She may make minor suggestions during the 
rehearsal process about individual words here and there that ring false, or she 
might help the playwright shape every scene by talking through character, 
action, structure, and meaning before actors get anywhere near the text.
65
  The 
playwright is generally the person who distills those conversations into words 
on the page, but in every collaboration, the percentage of the cloud of ideas 
from which the play is born that “belongs” to the dramaturg is not zero. 
When the production is of a classic play, the animating question is rarely 
how to convey the story clearly, though it is nice when creative teams 
remember to attend to this concern as well.  Instead, the question might be 
one of abrasion—when producing a version of Hamlet in 2021, how to cut 
through the layers and layers of cultural accretion that have settled on this 
language since 1600?  How is this Hamlet going to do the great “To be or not 
to be” speech in a way that feels truthful and present-tense and fully embodied, 
and not like a pale imitation of Richard Burton imitating Laurence Olivier 
imitating John Gielgud?  Or, if what one is after is a production that 
intentionally invokes all of these ghosts, how does one artfully trigger those 
memories, those references?  For a production of a classic play that uses the 
text as pretext for a new “story” the creative team is telling about cultural 
inheritance, the framing of text, the critique of text, the citing (or site-ing) of 
 
 62 See e.g., Walter Byongsok Chon, Intercultural Dramaturgy: Dramaturg as Cultural Liaison, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO DRAMATURGY, supra note 59, at 138 (providing a personal anecdote 
of a dramaturg who provided maps, historical research, news articles, journals, and glossaries for 
actors).  
 63 See Switzky, supra note 59, at 175 (describing Christopher Baker’s notes of his time as a dramaturg 
where he helped the director translate another screenwriter’s screenplay into the physical stage set). 
 64 See id. at 176 (noting that dramaturgs often select new scripts from a pile of submissions). 
 65 See id. (noting that dramaturgs painstakingly review every detail and word in a script and often try to 
elicit multiple “audience reactions to the same performance”). 
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text, or the strategic ignoring of text become more important than the text 
itself.  The form becomes more communicative than the “content.”  
The dramaturg is a shadowy figure in the theater, her role a mysterious 
one because—with the exception of her most superficial contributions—she 
works through others.  She has no creative “control” in the traditional sense.  
As a rule, her ideas must be executed by other collaborators.  She whispers in 
the ears of the playwright and the director.  Sometimes she finds that 
straightforwardly making suggestions is less effective than insinuating an idea 
into the mind of her collaborator and allowing him to believe that it is his own.  
Sometimes her ideas are rejected, but they inspire ideas that come to shape 
the production.  Most often, her ideas are entertained, revised, and entwined 
with the impulses of other collaborators so that when they are ultimately 
realized in production the collaboratively-achieved product has become 
something greater than the sum of its parts.  In a dynamically collaborative art 
form such as the theater, it is often impossible to perceive where one person’s 
contribution ends and another’s begins.  In the theater, individual authorship 
is always a fiction. 
Increasingly, for much of our most sophisticated contemporary theater—
what we call postdramatic theater—the authorship is in the dramaturgy itself, 
whether there is a person called a dramaturg attached to the production or 
not.
66
  However much this new mode of theatrical authorship might be 
accepted and acknowledged in the art-critical literature, the law has, 
lamentably, lagged behind.  Our current joint authorship doctrine is woefully 
inadequate for assigning value to the contributions of collaborators even in the 
traditional theater, where artistic roles are more recognizable and well-defined.  
It is utterly unsuited to parsing the more complex and mutable vectors of 
authorship in more experimental, de-hierarchized collaborative 
configurations. 
III. STATE OF THE LAW 
The Copyright Act of 1976 imperfectly codified what had developed as 
the common-law understanding of joint authorship.  In the 1915 case Maurel 
v. Smith, Judge Learned Hand noted that there was “strangely little law 
regarding the rights of joint authors of books or dramatic compositions” and 
 
 66 KATALIN TRENCSÉNYI & BERNADETTE COCHRANE, NEW DRAMATURGY: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THEORY AND PRACTICE, at xiii (2014) (“Compared with traditional dramaturgical 
roles, the ‘new dramaturg’ is nearer to the centre of creation; sometimes so near that the role itself 
dissolves and is taken on by the company.”). 
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deemed the contested opera before him a joint work when it was 
demonstrated that the plaintiff provided a scenario, or detailed plot outline, 
that the defendant librettists heavily relied on in drafting their contributions.
67
  
“A scenario followed as much as this,” he wrote, “goes into the bone and flesh 
of the production.”
68
  Judge Hand, widely regarded as our most discerning 
copyright jurist, has been praised for “his characteristic skepticism about 
deceptive generalities.”
69
  For Hand, “case-by-case adjudication would have to 
do.”
70
  In fact, he often reasoned from such bespoke metaphors, finding 
appropriately artful language for each artistic undertaking he found himself 
called upon to appraise.
71
 
Judge Hand’s jurisprudence also formed the basis for much of our 
generalizable joint authorship doctrine during a period when the statutory 
framework for copyright was silent on the question of joint works.
72
  Citing 
English precedent in Maurel, he held that: 
 [I]f two persons undertake jointly to write a play, agreeing on the general 
outline and design and sharing the labor of working it out, each would be 
contributing to the whole production, and they might be said to be joint 
authors of it; but to constitute joint authorship there must be a common 
design.
73
   
In 1944, Judge Hand held that a song was the joint work of a composer and 
lyricist because “they mean[t] their contributions to be complementary in the 
sense that they [we]re to be embodied in a single work to be performed as 
such.”
74
  These principles have persisted, but additional judge-made 
requirements have made the doctrine poorly suited to certain kinds of 
collective creation. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 defines a “joint work” as “a work prepared by 
two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into 
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”
75
  Circuits are divided 
 
 67 Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: Outstanding Copyright Judge: The 24th Annual Donald C. Brace 
Lecture, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 315, 320 (1994). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See, e.g., Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944) 
(“To allow the author to prevent the composer, or the composer to prevent the author, from 
exploiting that power to please, would be to allow him to deprive his fellow of the most valuable part 
of his contribution; to take away the kernel, and leave him only the husk.”). 
 72 See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (omitting statutory guidelines 
on generalizable joint authorship). 
 73 Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. at 199 (quoting Levy v. Rutley, L.R. 6 C.P. 523, 529 (1871)). 
 74 Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 140 F.2d at 267. 
 75 17 U.S.C. §101 (2018). 
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on the question what constitutes a “contribution” within the meaning of the 
statute.  For a work to qualify as a joint work in the Ninth Circuit, for example, 
each author must have made an “independently copyrightable contribution” 
to the work.
76
  The Second Circuit has also reluctantly recognized this 
requirement, even while observing that the component parts of a joint work 
are by definition seldom wholly independent of one another.
77
  Parts of a 
unitary whole are “inseparable[,]” said the Childress v. Taylor court in 1991, 
“when they have little or no independent meaning standing alone.”
78
  By 
contrast, parts of a unitary whole are “interdependent,” that court said, when 
“they have some meaning standing alone but achieve their primary significance 
because of their combined effect . . . .”
79
  The D.C. Circuit has adopted 
Nimmer’s view that the contribution of each author need only be “more than 
de minimis” and that “one may qualify as a joint author even if his 
contribution, ‘standing alone would not be copyrightable.’”
80
  Judge Posner in 
the Seventh Circuit has lucidly observed that there must at least be exceptions 
to the independently copyrightable contribution requirement.
81
  “The 
decisions that say,” he wrote in Gaiman v. McFarlane, “that each contributor 
to a joint work must make a contribution that if it stood alone would be 
copyrightable weren’t thinking of the case in which it couldn’t stand alone 
because of the nature of the particular creative process that had produced it.”
82
  
Such creative processes, I contend, are increasingly coming to be the rule and 
not the exception in contemporary art-making, and the institution of copyright 
should be adjusted accordingly. 
The biggest problem with our current joint works doctrine is that, “[i]n a 
joint work, the joint authors hold undivided interests in a work, despite any 
differences in each author’s contribution.”
83
  This means that “[i]n the absence 
of an agreement specifying otherwise, any profits earned are to be divided 
equally,” even when the joint authors’ contributions to the work are clearly 
 
 76 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 
916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 77 See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that each artist must contribute 
independent artistic elements to qualify as a joint work while also noting that each creative part would 
entitle the contributor to an individual copyright).  
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting 1 M. 
NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.03, at 6-6, § 6.17, at 6-18 (1985). 
 81 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that mere suggestions about the 
addition of artistic elements does not make the suggester and the artist joint authors). 
 82 Id. at 659. 
 83 Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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unequal.
84
  The practical implication of this inflexible rule is that courts are 
exceedingly reluctant to recognize joint works as such unless the authors 
commence their collaboration with the demonstrably unambiguous intention 
of sharing and sharing alike, or unless the authors can be shown to have in fact 
made roughly equal contributions to the final form the work takes.  Under 
current law, the collaborator who lacks an advance, formal co-authorship 
agreement and cannot be shown to have contributed an “equal” share will 




The best advice an attorney can currently give an artist client embarking 
on a collaborative project is to get the terms of their agreement in writing 
before anyone so much as walks into a rehearsal room or shares an idea.  
Courts tend to defer to such written agreements.
86
  Because of the inherent 
fluidity of the collaborative process, though, this is not an adequate solution to 
the problem of fairly apportioning ownership stakes in collaboratively-
generated works.  It would fatally inhibit the free exchange of ideas if whenever 
the “terms” of a collaborative relationship shifted, the artists felt obliged to 
pause and revise the terms of their contract before proceeding with their work.  
Momentum is often a critical component of successful collaboration.  So is 
trust.  So is a certain freedom from inhibition.   
In the theater, when a production is being rehearsed, it is often the job of 
the stage manager to observe and record the work of the director and actors 
as they “block” scenes, developing the physical movements and emotional 
score that the actors will use during performances.  After the actor has tried 
the scene half a dozen times entering from stage left, half a dozen times 
entering from stage right, and half a dozen times entering through the center 
aisle in the house, the stage manager might be the only person who not only 
remembers but has a written record of what decision about the entrance was 
ultimately made.  The stage manager’s notes can then be referred back to at a 
subsequent rehearsal or once performances have begun to make sure that the 
performers are hewing close to the agreed-upon blocking.  To properly keep 
tabs on an evolving joint authorship relationship, the creative team would also 
have to invite an intellectual property attorney to sit in on every rehearsal and 
every pre- and post-rehearsal conversation about rehearsal over dinner, over 
drinks, on the walk to the train.  The team would have to conference said 
 
 84 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 846 F.2d at 1498. 
 85 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683, 1688 (2014). 
 86 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that courts look for written agreements 
to see if the parties intended to be co-authors). 
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intellectual property attorney in on every late-night phone call between the 
playwright and the director or any other configuration of collaborators.  The 
attorney would be professionally obligated to interrupt every few minutes to 
point out that the way things were going, the team should really take a few 
minutes to revise the terms of their co-authorship agreement.  The rehearsal 
process would take thrice as long, the joy of discovery would be extinguished 
by the pedantic presence of the attorney, and the team would likely have to 
pay the attorney a fee exceeding the amount the production stood to ultimately 
gross.
87
 While such an arrangement might itself make for an amusing modern 
comedy of manners, it is of course thoroughly impractical as a solution to the 
problem of joint authorship.  Instead, it falls to the courts to make such 




In the realm of patent law, it is acknowledged that the contested 
innovations are often the product of special technical expertise, and that it is 
best for everyone if such cases are adjudicated by judges who are at least 
passingly familiar with the way scientists and engineers think.
89
  Copyright 
issues for the arts, however, are entrusted to generalist judges who may never 
have seen the inside of a studio or rehearsal room.
90
  Unsurprisingly, this too 
often results in judges misunderstanding the nature of collaborative dynamics 
and issuing inequitable rulings on authorship because they are left to analogize 
from what they know of more conservative, traditionally hierarchical 
professional contexts. 
In Cabrera v. Teatro del Sesenta, for example, the judge charged with 
assessing the authorship of a collectively-created play devotes pages of her 
 
 87 Jon Garon, Director’s Choice: The Fine Line Between Interpretation and Infringement of an 
Author’s Work, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 277, 303 (1988) (“A contractual solution to decide 
who owns the rights to the different elements in the initial production is still problematic on the 
pragmatic level.  The nature of not-for-profit theatre, workshops and the other forms of play 
development militate against any solution which increases the need for documentation and paper 
work. . . . The authors and producers who are most in need of these agreements are often the very 
people who are without the resources to utilize them.”). 
 88 Balganesh, supra note 85, at 1696. 
 89 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) (remanding a 
patent case to the Federal Circuit with the benediction, “we see no purpose in going further and 
micromanaging the Federal Circuit’s particular word choice . . . . We expect that the Federal Circuit 
will refine the formulation . . . and we leave such refinement to that court’s sound judgment in this 
area of its special expertise.”). 
 90 Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 864 (noting 
with satisfaction that the iconic American judge remains a generalist: “The generalist seems much 
more likely to be, in Isaiah Berlin’s famous typology, a fox (someone who knows many things) rather 
than a hedgehog (someone who knows one big thing)”). 
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opinion to cataloguing the relative expertise (measured in significant part by 
graduate degrees and faculty appointments in Theater Studies) of the project’s 
contributors.
91
 “The task . . . is more difficult than simply assessing the 
credibility of the witnesses,” Judge Delgado-Colón wrote, “[b]oth 
parties . . . had the necessary expertise, knowledge and skills within the theater 
media to have completed and rehearsed the script over a rather short period 
of time, and both parties had been involved in adaptations of works of other 
writers.”
92
  Such considerations should have exactly nothing to do with 
determining authorship.  Anton Chekhov studied medicine and then 
practiced as a physician for most of his career as a writer.
93
  Sam Shepard 
briefly studied animal husbandry at a junior college, then dropped out before 
graduating to pursue theater.
94
 
IV. STATE OF THE ART 
While our existing joint works doctrine does not adequately accommodate 
theater in general, it is entirely ill-suited to much of the formally innovative or 
otherwise experimental theater that is today regarded as the most critically 
significant.  In the U.S., this avant-garde lineage includes the Living Theater, 
the Performance Group, Bread and Puppet Theater, Robert Wilson, Richard 
Foreman, the Wooster Group, and Mabou Mines.
95
  As the names on this list 
suggest, most of these key innovators are companies of collaborators who 
share creative responsibilities, rather than specialized individual creators.
96
  In 
the 1960s and 1970s, roughly around the same time now-canonical European 
 
 91 914 F. Supp. 743, 746–750 (D.P.R. 1995). 
 92 Id. at 752. 
 93 See Alexander Chudakov, Dr Chekhov: A Biographical Essay (29 January 1860–15 July 1904), in 
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO CHEKHOV 3, 11 (Vera Gottlieb & Paul Allain eds., 2000) 
(providing a biography of Anton Chekhov). 
 94 See John O’Mahony, The Write Stuff, GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2003), 
https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2003/oct/11/theatre.music (profiling Sam Shepard). 
 95 See generally THEODORE SHANK, AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE THEATER (1982) (examining 
alternative theater in the United States). 
 96 See id. at 3 (“Instead of the two-process method of the conventional theatre—a playwright writing a 
script in isolation and other artists staging it—the autonomous method involves a single process 
wherein the same artists develop the work from initial conception to finished performance.  In part 
the development of this method was a reaction against the psychic fragmentation the artists 
experienced in the technocratic society which believed that human needs could be satisfied by 
technical means requiring a high degree of specialization.  Instead of the individual specialists of the 
established theatre, the typical member of an alternative theatre has broad creative responsibilities.”). 
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literary theorists were pronouncing the “death of the author,”
97
 the American 
theater began its repudiation of the preeminence of the playwright and the 
centrality of narrative drama and language to the theatrical event.
98
 What 
emerged to displace the old drama was what Hans-Thies Lehmann calls 
postdramatic theater, a general aesthetic category within which subgenres 
including devised theater, site-specific theater, and the theater of images may 
be identified.
99
  These forms remain among the most vital forms of theatrical 
production in the twenty-first century.
100
 
A. Devised Theater 
“Devising” can be understood as “a mode of work in which no script—
neither written play-text nor performance score—exists prior to the work’s 
creation by the company.”
101
  The Wooster Group, named for the address of 
their home base in lower Manhattan,
102
 is one company that exemplifies this 
style of production.
103
  Together, the Wooster Group fashions performances 
from assorted “pieces of culture,” as the company’s frequent director 
Elizabeth LeCompte inclusively calls them.
104
  Source material might include 
 
 97 See ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE MUSIC TEXT 148 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977) (“We are now 
beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer by the arrogant antiphrastical recriminations of good 
society in favour of the very thing it sets aside, ignores, smothers, or destroys; we know that to give 
writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of 
the death of the Author.”). 
 98 See, e.g., Bonnie Marranca, Introduction to THE THEATRE OF IMAGES, at ix (Bonnie Marranca ed., 
Johns Hopkins U. Press 1996) (1977) (“Experimental groups of the sixties and early seventies broke 
down traditional parameters of theatrical experience by introducing new approaches to acting, 
playwriting and the creation of theatrical environments; they reorganized audience and performing 
space relationships, and eliminated dialogue from drama.  Collaborative creation became the rule.”); 
see also Richard Schechner, The Decline and Fall of the (American) Avant-Garde: Why It 
Happened and What We Can Do About It, 5 PERFORMING ARTS J., 9, 10 (1981) (“When the sixties 
began, a challenge was proclaimed by directors against writers.  We directors wanted to shape texts—
the whole collection of ‘texts’ theatrically speaking: words, space, audience interaction with the 
performance, performer training, acting.  Directors wanted writers to cease dictating their ‘intentions’ 
to us; or to insist that directors and performers ought to be mere ‘interpreters.’”). 
 99 See generally HANS-THIES LEHMANN, POSTDRAMATIC THEATRE (Karen Jürs-Munby trans., 2006) 
(providing a study of the theatre forms that have developed since the 1960s). 
 100 See generally THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PERFORMANCE READER (Terry Brayshaw, Anna 
Fenemore & Noel Witts eds., 2020) (compiling extracts from performance experts to form a 
sourcebook on performance art). 
 101 DEIRDRE HEDDON & JANE MILLING, DEVISING PERFORMANCE: A CRITICAL HISTORY 3 (2006). 
 102 See DAVID SAVRAN, BREAKING THE RULES: THE WOOSTER GROUP 3-5 (1986) (providing a brief 
history of the origins of the Wooster Group). 
 103 See id. at 2 (describing the ways in which the Wooster Group “rejected the commercial theatre and 
its mode of production, choosing instead to create their own producing organizations”). 
 104 ELINOR FUCHS, THE DEATH OF CHARACTER: PERSPECTIVES ON THEATER AFTER MODERNISM 
113 (1996). 

















or previously-written dramatic material.
112
  In their 1975 Sakonnet Point and 
1977 Rumstick Road, the Wooster Group used the autobiography of 
company member Spalding Gray, whose mother had recently committed 
suicide, as a starting point.
113
  Sakonnet Point “was not planned in detail before 
rehearsals began, but [Gray] knew that he wanted to make a play about his 
growing up.”
114
  Gray brought objects, mainly children’s toys, to each rehearsal 
and “[t]he play was built entirely from free associations as the performers 
improvised with the objects.”
115
  For Rumstick Road, Gray brought in letters 
written by his parents, old family photos, and tape recordings he had made 
with family members and the psychiatrist who treated his mother during her 
breakdown.
116  Again, the play took shape through group improvisations the 
performers did in response to this material.
117
  These two productions were 
billed as “composed by” Spalding Gray and Elizabeth LeCompte “in 





 105 SAVRAN, supra note 102, at 19. 
 106 FUCHS, supra note 104. 
 107 Ryan M. Davis, Double Exposure, 34 PAJ: J. PERFORMANCE & ART 46, 50 (2012). 
 108 SAVRAN, supra note 102, at 14. 
 109 Id. at 51. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Davis, supra note 107. 
 112 SAVRAN, supra note 104, at 51. 
 113 SHANK, supra note 95, at 171. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 171–172. 
 117 See id. at 172 (“As the group worked with the tapes, using them as background for their 
improvisations and exploring through improvisation some of the situations described, surreal dream-
like imagery emerged.  In real life Gray’s mother, a Christian Scientist, believed that she had been 
visited by Christ and had been healed by him.  This led to an improvisation in which The Man 
attempts to heal The Woman.  The improvisation culminated in a scene in which Gray, with a sheet 
over him, lies under a table.  The Woman lies on the table.  The Man raises her dress exposing her 
mid-section and gives a lecture to the audience about a process for relaxing the muscles of the torso.  
The lecture is followed by a demonstration in which he massages The Woman’s belly with his hands 
and then with his lips, causing The Woman to laugh hysterically.”).  
 118 Rumstick Road, THE WOOSTER GROUP (last visited Oct. 21, 2020),  
http://thewoostergroup.org/rumstick-road. 
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B. The Theater of Images 
The “theater of images” has been described as a mode of theatrical 
authorship in which “the painterly and sculptural qualities of performance are 
stressed, transforming this theatre into a spatially-dominated one activated by 
sense impressions, as opposed to a time-dominated one ruled by linear 
narrative.”
119
  One of the companies that exemplifies this aesthetic is Mabou 
Mines.  When their 1970 Red Horse Animation was selected for inclusion in 
critic Bonnie Marranca’s seminal anthology The Theatre of Images, it was 
determined that a color comic approximating the look and feel of the 
production would more faithfully capture the essence of the production than 
would a traditional script with only dialogue and stage directions.
120
  Like the 
Wooster Group, Mabou Mines uses a collective creation model.
121
  From the 
beginning, they embraced a catholic range of source material, and “everyone 
wrote, directed, performed, and designed.”
122
  In Red Horse Animation, an 
attempt to narrate the emotional life of the piece’s eponymous horse, the 
company radically redefined the traditional, proscenium-framed use of theater 
space by taking their performances horizontal—much of the play was 
performed with the actors lying down, using the floor as backdrop with the 
audience watching from above.
123
  To evoke the subjective experience of its 
subject, the piece unfolds in “a series of non-sequential stage pictures.”
124
  Many 
of these pictures were generated by the company in improvisational response 
to photographs of horses in motion.
125
  The performers did not play 
individuated characters, but rather spoke a series of choral narratives while 
arranging their bodies into corresponding images, creating a fragmented, 





 119 Marranca, supra note 98, at xii. 
 120 See id. at 124–156 (capturing vivid colors and strong imagery).  
 121 See IRIS SMITH FISCHER, MABOU MINES: MAKING AVANT-GARDE THEATER IN THE 1970S 5 
(2011) (“The Members of Mabou Mines were (and still are) its artistic directors and executive 
board.”).  
 122 Id. at 6. 
 123 See Lee Breuer, Mabou Mines, in THE THEATRE OF IMAGES, supra note 100, at 113 (describing the 
use of performance space in Red Horse).  
 124 Id.  
 125 Id. at 115–16. 
 126 Id. at 115.  
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C. Site-Specific Theater  
Site-specific performances are, generally speaking “conceived for, 
mounted within and conditioned by the particulars of found spaces, existing 
social situations or locations, both used and disused . . . . They are inseparable 
from their sites, the only contexts within which they are intelligible.”
127
  A site-
specific performance is typically tailor-made for the place where it is to be 
staged—if there is a text, it is likely to be selected because it suits the location, 
rather than the other way around.
128
  This was how production company En 
Garde Arts and director Reza Abdoh’s Father Was a Peculiar Man, an 
adaptation of The Brothers Karamazov, came together in 1990.129  Producer 
Anne Hamburger selected the streets of Manhattan’s then-ungentrified 
Meatpacking District.
130
  “Congested and bloody with animal carcasses in the 
early morning hours,” it was “scarily deserted in the evening,” as one critic put 
it, frequented primarily by transgender sex workers and their customers.
131
  
The audience roamed the streets and interiors of surrounding warehouses 
with the actors, who leaned heavily into the violent and vulgar aspects of 
Dostoevsky’s story of patricide, free will, and morality.
132
  For the climax of the 
performance, the entire hundred-person audience was seated en plein air at a 
block-long dining table, upon which the actors performed obscene acts instead 
of serving food.
133
  The text, such as it was, functioned as mere pretext for the 
total sensory experience of being in a corridor of the city one would never 
otherwise dare to venture into after dark, the feelings of danger and 
transgression, the sights and smells of animal and human flesh on sale.
134
 
Perhaps the most formidable example of site-specific theater is director 
Robert Wilson’s 1972 KA MOUNTAIN AND GUARDenia TERRACE: a 
story of a family and some people changing, a single performance staged at 
different locations atop Haft Tan Mountain in Shiraz, Iran.
135
  The 
 
 127 MIKE PEARSON & MICHAEL SHANKS, THEATRE/ARCHAEOLOGY 23 (2001). 
 128 See, e.g., FUCHS, supra note 104, at 135 (explaining how The Brothers Karamazov was set in the 
infamous New York meatpacking district, creating a “frantic mise-en-scène”). 
 129 Id.  
 130 Id.  
 131 Id. 
 132 See id. at 135–36 (noting that spectators could browse rooms that included “a scene of a fashion 
mannequin lying under a circular saw blade with blood on her neck [ ] near a scene of hooded monks 
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performance lasted seven continuous days and nights and was organized 
around the audience’s progression up seven peaks of the mountain.
136
  
Audiences had to brave intense heat during the day and the cold of the night, 
sitting “huddled under blankets against wind and blinding dust storms.”
137
  For 
a performance of such magnitude, no one involved could possibly stay awake 
and aware for the entirety of the performance without occasionally pausing for 
sleep: not the performers, not the spectators, not even Wilson, the master of 
ceremonies himself.
138
  At least in part out of necessity, he delegated some 
directing and writing responsibilities to other members of the company, 
including nine-year-old Jessie Dunn Gilbert.
139
  Wilson made the piece’s most 
expressively determinative creative decision by choosing the location where 
KA MOUNTAIN would be staged, but countless acts of authorship contained 
by the vast performance took place without his knowledge, let alone his 
approval. 
D. Recent Developments 
In recent years, some experimental theater ensembles have returned to 
using text to anchor their aesthetic explorations, but they continue to eschew 
plays and playwriting in favor of various kinds of “found texts” which become 
pretexts for productions.  The company Elevator Repair Service has created 
stagings of classic American novels, including Gatz, an eight-hour production 
of The Great Gatsby that preserves every last word of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
text.
140
  While certain parallels between the novel’s characters and those 
embodied by the performers onstage gradually emerge, the adaptation is by 
no means a traditional adaptation—in this version, a depressed modern office 
worker picks up a copy of the novel, starts reading, and does not stop until he 
gets to the little green light at the end of Daisy’s dock.
141
  His co-workers join 
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in and hijinks ensue; the text is both central to and separate from the creative 
work that made the production, which jumps off of its source text and becomes 
something else entirely.
142
  In their 2013 Arguendo, Elevator Repair Service 
staged verbatim the entire oral argument of  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, a 1991 
Supreme Court case that dealt with the question of whether an Indiana law 
banning public nudity violated the First Amendment rights of the group of 
erotic dancers who brought the action.
143
  In 2019, the company Half Straddle 
fashioned a piece from the transcript of an FBI interview with Reality Winner, 
who went to federal prison for leaking information about Russian interference 
in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
144
 
In none of the work discussed in this section would it make sense to give 
the lion’s share of the authorial credit to a “playwright,” if indeed a playwright 
could even be identified—the authorship of such productions is clearly in the 
dramaturgy—and yet copyright law persists in its hopelessly outdated 
logocentricism.  The law persists in privileging the collaborator who puts the 
proverbial pen to paper even though the art moved on long ago. 
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
There have long been calls for either a formal, statutory amendment to the 
existing joint works doctrine or a shift in the way joint authorship disputes are 
adjudicated.  None of the proposed strategies for modifying the law go far 
enough toward accommodating postdramatic theater. 
Susan Keller proposes two alternatives.  First, she suggests doing away with 
the automatic grant of the entire copyright to the playwright, and instead 
dividing the copyright among “all the actual ‘authors.’”
145
  In this scenario, the 
collaborators would be required to agree on their respective contributions, as 
determined at the time of the work’s first public performance.
146
  Should the 
parties prove unable to come to an agreement, “a neutral body should be 
appointed to arbitrate a binding allocation decision.”
147
  The existing 
professional organization Keller nominates to be responsible for convening 
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straddle.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article. 
 145 Keller, supra note 58, at 934. 
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such a body is the Dramatists Guild, the national trade association of 
playwrights, composers, lyricists, and librettists.
148
  This solution is inadequate 
because, as even Keller herself recognizes, the Dramatists Guild is “not 
absolutely neutral.”
149
  This is an understatement.  The Dramatists Guild exists 
for the express purpose of “aiding dramatists in protecting both the artistic and 
economic integrity of their work.”
150
  The Guild was specifically founded to 
help wrest copyright ownership away from producers and secure it for 
playwrights.
151
  All of the Guild’s board members are playwrights, composers, 
lyricists, or librettists.
152
  Bias towards the interests of playwrights is baked into 
the mission of the Guild; it would be inappropriate for them to exhibit 
neutrality in arbitrating a dispute between a playwright and a director, 
dramaturg, or actor, and it would be naïve to expect them to exhibit such 
neutrality. 
Keller’s second proposal would require no change to the Copyright Act.
153
  
Instead, the playwright would retain ownership of the copyright for the original 
script as written.
154
  In addition, a new and separate copyright would be 
available for the production script, which would be treated as a derivative 
work.
155
  The ownership of the production script copyright would be 
apportioned according to how much other collaborators in fact contributed to 
the new dialogue and written stage directions that made it into the new version 
of the script.
156
  Here, too, a “neutral arbitrating body,” presumably convened 
by the Dramatist’s Guild, would assist with settling any disputes.
157
  This 
proposal is flawed for the same reasons Keller’s first proposal is—it is bound 
to unfairly favor playwrights.  This second proposal also unhelpfully reverts to 
the logocentricism that contemporary theater artists are increasingly rejecting. 
Jennifer Womack argues that the theatrical production of a script should 
receive a single copyright designating the production as a derivative work—
derived from the playwright’s written script—and designating the producer as 
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the sole proprietor.
158
  This overly logocentric proposal is further flawed 
because it rewards investing in art, but not making art.  While there has been 
the occasional visionary producer-director like Anne Hamburger or, in the 
commercial theater, Hal Prince, whose personal aesthetic has seemed to 
suffuse every production they sponsor, such active artistic involvement is not 
a traditional part of the producer’s job description.
159
  The role of the producer 
is generally that of a facilitator.  Their main and only indispensable role is that 
of fundraiser.  This is of course an important role, but since the producer’s 
connection to the production is more likely to be merely financial than 
personal or expressive, the producer is the last person who should be able to 
claim authorship rights. 
Jane Lee acknowledges that “copyright law is not well-suited to the 
collaborative nature of theater” but argues that contract law sufficiently fills in 
the gaps left by copyright law.
160
  Ryan Richardson comes to a similar 
conclusion, making the rather befuddling claim that “[i]f the law is unable to 
adequately accommodate custom and practice, custom and practice must 
accommodate the law.”
161
  Richardson suggests that contract law, being the 
most malleable institution of enforcement, provides the best mechanism for 
regulating artistic relationships, raising again the specter of the intellectual 
property attorney in the rehearsal room.
162
  These proposals fail to grapple with 
the problem of unplanned coauthorship.
163
  They also exhibit an odd 
willingness to accept that copyright does not now and will never be able to 
adequately serve the needs of one entire major category of artistic production.  
Since the function of copyright is to promote and protect art and artists, unless 
the artist is proposing to violate some provision of the criminal code on stage, 
the law should whenever possible be structured to facilitate the customs and 
practices of artists, and not the other way around. 
Faye Buckalew has proposed leaving intact the requirement of the joint 
works doctrine that all contributors fully intend to be coauthors, but changing 
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the way this intention is evaluated.
164
  Rather than using a purely subjective 
standard, Buckalew advocates adopting a version of the “reasonable person” 
standard to assess whether the parties intended to be coauthors.
165
  The court 
would consider “whether a reasonable person would use the work of another 
in the manner in which it was used and not expect the other person to receive 
authorship status for that contribution” and “whether a reasonable person 
making such a contribution would expect to be considered an author.”
166
  This 
adjustment, Buckalew persuasively argues, would prevent a collaborator in a 
position favored by the statute from denying other contributors coauthorship 
status simply because she “unreasonably believes herself to be the sole creator 
of a work.”
167
  Buckalew’s suggestion is an excellent one, but it does not go far 
enough. 
VI. UNITED STATES COURT OF ART APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
Since the federal government has no legitimate interest in favoring or 
promoting text-based narrative drama over other forms of live art, Congress 
would do well to consider amending the Copyright Act so that it: (1) 
Invalidates the judge-made law that currently requires an independently 
copyrightable contribution for joint authors in theater and (2) Makes space for 
the law to pay attention to the relative contributions of the coauthors of a joint 
work, and to assign them proportional ownership shares rather than 
automatically assigning them equal ownership stakes that do not correspond 
to their actual contributions.  These adjustments could also be brought about 
judicially by overruling bad precedents. 
Moving forward, however, it should not be generalist judges charged with 
settling copyright disputes between artists after a collaboration gone awry.  
Learned Hand was an exception that proved the rule, and measures should 
be taken to ensure that more judges of his caliber, aesthetically attuned and 
somewhat sensitive to the workings of the creative process, handle our 
important copyright cases.  Worries about unqualified judges being thrust into 
the role of art critic are well-established, but have been newly articulated by 
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those in both the legal community and the art world in recent years.
168
 Asking 
generalist judges to speculate about what goes on behind the scenes is similarly 
fraught.  Art, like science, has a specialized technical language all its own, and 
the conditions under which art is made are particular and often peculiar.  To 
increase the likelihood of fair outcomes for artists and the public in general, 
we should establish a Court of Appeals for Art akin to the Federal Circuit.
169
  
Just as the Federal Circuit is presided over by specialist judges with the 
requisite technical background to ensure that they understand the scientific 
material before them in patent cases, a Court of Appeals for Art could be 
presided over by judges who had some training in the arts and some familiarity 
with the creative process.  As the Federal Circuit has judges who have worked 
as engineers or hold doctoral degrees in chemistry,
170
 the Court of Appeals for 
Art could have judges who have danced with ballet companies, written novels, 
or who hold doctoral degrees in theater.  Such a court would be far more likely 
to be, like Learned Hand, skeptical of deceptive generalities.  Such a court 
could be expected to render well-informed judgements on a case-by-case basis, 
ensuring that we adequately reward the unconventional and experimental at 
least as consistently as we do the hackneyed and mainstream. 
If it is to be true to its constitutional mandate, copyright law must promote 
artistic progress, that is to say, experimentation and innovation.  In this Article, 
I have confined my observations to those copyright problems presented by 
certain subcategories of theater, but scholars of dance, music, film, and the 
visual arts could identify comparable problems in the application of copyright 
law to works in their fields.  It may be too much to ask that the law keep pace 
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with the manifold developments in the ever-expanding (and increasingly 
interdisciplinary) art world, but a new, specialized Article III court could at 
least mitigate against the law being left where it is today, in the proverbial dust. 
